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Abstract 
 
 Japan persists as one of the few countries in the world partaking in the hunting of 
cetaceans, the branch of the animal kingdom that includes whales, dolphins and porpoises.  The 
International Whaling Commission’s 1986 moratorium on commercial whaling has established a 
majority international opinion about the ethics of hunting cetaceans.  Japan, however, does not 
adhere to this global trend.  I argue that Japan’s cetacean hunting policies are unjustified in light 
of customary international practice, and I attempt to show how Japanese policy can be informed 
by considering the intrinsic value of nature, in the form of both biocentric and ecocentric 
perspectives on environmental ethics.  This is done by showing how existing frameworks of 
international law do account for the intrinsic value of cetaceans in both biocentric and ecocentric 
ways, and by demonstrating how Japanese practices are inconsistent with those of the global 
community. 
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PHILOSOPHICAL-LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR ENDING JAPANESE HUNTING 
OF SMALL CETACEANS 
A COMPREHENSIVE POLICY ARGUMENT 
Emily C. Sipes 
 
“It is a late hour on the biological clock  
that controls cetacean destiny.”  
–Richard Falk 
 
In undertaking this policy argument, I ask: “Is the justification for Japan’s policies 
regarding the harvesting of small cetaceans (i.e. dolphins) adequate, given the requirements of 
either biocentric or ecocentric models of evaluation?” 
I will argue that the justification for current Japanese dolphin policy is inadequate 
because it does not account for the intrinsic value of the natural environment.  Japanese dolphin 
policy fails in terms of both eccentric and biocentric evaluation models. First, from a biocentric 
perspective, Japanese policy ignores the intrinsic value of dolphins as highly intelligent 
creatures.  Second, from an ecocentric perspective, Japanese policy ignores the functional 
intrinsic value of dolphins as fundamental components of healthy aquatic ecosystems.   
In an isolated cove near the village of Taiji, Japan, the majority of economic activity 
centers around the hunting of dolphins and other small cetaceans, a practice called “drive 
hunting” and known locally as the “Oikomi method” (Reiss & Marino 2007).  This hunting 
technique requires fishermen in the open ocean to lower long hollow metal rods into the water.  
Banging repeatedly on these rods creates a large series of unnatural sound waves under the 
surface, which greatly disrupts dolphins’ complex sonar navigation and communication patterns.  
Confused and disoriented, the affected dolphins are corralled into the cove by the fishermen still 
in boats, and they are then sealed off from the main body of water.  The fishermen choose the 
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best of the harvested dolphins to be sold for the entertainment industry, a lucrative business that 
yields up to $150,000 per live bottlenose caught.  The remaining animals in the catch are killed 
with harpoons while swimming in shallow water.  Dolphins not sold into captivity are then 
processed for use in fertilizer, pet food, and for human consumption (Reiss & Marino 2007).  Up 
to 20,000 small cetaceans are killed every year in Japanese waters. 
Japan’s dolphin hunting policies and practices have led to widespread international 
controversy.  Some contend that Japan’s treatment of the species is inhumane and that the 
killings are unnecessary. Although most nations believe there are certain basic obligations to the 
environment that ought hold internationally, it is clear that in this case, a modern nation still 
finds reason to reject international environmental obligations for the sake of economic goals. 
However, Japanese consciousness of international environmental law has made them 
work hard to ‘scientifically’ justify hunting.  Japan has invested heavily in producing scientific 
evidence to back their case that their cetacean populations can sustain the impact of “limited 
harvests” (Simmonds & Hutchinson 1996).  Further, the Japanese Institute of Cetacean Research 
claims that lethal takes are required for the purposes of accurate research, whereas benign DNA 
sampling would be inadequate.  Japan has not observed the International Whaling Commission’s 
1986 moratorium on commercial whaling due to its alleged economic reliance on the proceeds 
from show animals and dolphin meat.  However, speculation as to the legitimacy of their claims 
remains prevalent in the international arena.  Thanks to the work of a number of activists and 
environmental nonprofit organizations, the status of Japan’s continued dolphin hunting has 
recently been brought to greater public attention.  The Japanese drive hunts appear to run 
contrary to global trends in ecosystem management and animal welfare, and represent traditions 
4 
 
that today seem inconsistent with the values of a contemporary and ethically aware culture (Reiss 
& Marino 2007). 
Since opposition to commercial whaling began in the 1970s, the debate surrounding 
human management of marine resources has undergone a shift from an argument for the 
protection of a natural resource to one which questions the fundamental rights of humanity—if 
any—regarding the use of the environment (Simmonds & Hutchinson 1996, 56).  The shift in 
attitudes towards animals from an extractive conservationist to a protectionist orientation has 
caused serious problems between the United States and other countries with differing views 
(Aron 1988, 99).  Normally, encroaching upon the rights of a small number of countries is not 
condoned; just because one’s actions are viewed as offensive by others does not necessarily 
mean they are ethically or morally wrong (Sandoe 1994).  Pro-whalers say that scientifically, 
cetacean populations can tolerate sustainable hunting when monitored.  They claim animal rights 
activists should divorce themselves from environmentalists whose argument is for conservation, 
whereas those calling for a total moratorium on whaling are demanding equal rights for 
cetaceans (Simmonds & Hutchinson 1996, 60).   
It may be the case that Japan sees international opinion as a way for Western powers to 
impose their ethical values and standards, a situation which would cost Japan a lot and other 
countries nothing (Aron 1988, 108).  Japan and other whaling countries, however, do not hesitate 
to point out that the real damage to cetacean stocks was carried out by previous whaling activity 
by the United States and United Kingdom.  Pro-whalers try to cast cetacean intelligence and 
friendliness to humans as a myth, claiming that there are certain people trying to persuade the 
world that whaling is something to be equated with the killing of human beings.  They assert that 
the real issue with their activities in the eyes of the animal rights activists is that those outraged 
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by the hunts are too far removed from the reality of what it means to harvest food, which renders 
them overly sensitive to the idea of killing cetaceans in any number (Simmonds & Hutchinson 
1996). 
The argument then becomes one of whether it is possible to bestow international legal 
status upon a species, either biocentrically or ecocentrically.  The main pro-whaling argument is 
that a total moratorium would interfere with national livelihood in Japan, and that ethical 
judgments based on knowledge must be seen in the light of cultural perspectives (Simmonds & 
Hutchinson 1996, 73-75).  Japan’s government counters the barrage of animal rights activists by 
asserting that continued cetacean harvesting preserves a fundamental right due to its human 
population.  Otherwise, some Japanese would be allegedly denied their identity, which according 
to the government would be a violation of something more precious than the idea of dolphin 
rights (Simmonds & Hutchinson 1996, 83). 
However, I contend that this does not adequately describe the situation surrounding 
Japan’s dolphins.  Cetaceans are part of the economic resources of the sea and thus the issue of 
dolphin protection is a global one (Simmonds & Hutchinson 1996, 25).  Unlike domesticated 
animals bred within national boundaries for the purpose of human consumption, cetaceans are 
migratory animals that make their home in international waters, and therefore should fall under 
international jurisdiction (Barstow 1989).  They constitute one of Earth’s shared resources, a fact 
which ought protect them from the commercial exploitation of a few nations. 
An issue can be a matter of personal virtue or a matter of public policy. If the former, the 
role of the state is to assure the privacy of the individual to make the choice, if the latter, 
however, the ramifications of the issue are collective and require public regulation.  We cannot 
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rely on dolphin preservation as a matter of personal virtue because the treatment of dolphins and 
the ecosystem in which they live have collective ramifications.  Rather, the law must coordinate 
human action with regard to the treatment of these animals given their intrinsic value, under one 
or both of our paradigms  It is through this critical understanding of Japanese dolphin policy that 
I argue for the establishment of a comprehensive set of international public policies for the 
coordination of human action as those actions pertain to ensuring or threatening the integrity of 
natural species.  Here, this will be attempted by making a policy argument founded on both 
biocentric and ecocentric perspectives on nature, which introduces provisions for the non-
instrumental valuation of organisms, necessary to treat the issue as a matter of international 
public policy. 
Two systems of environmental policy evaluation based on two ethical paradigms can be 
utilized in providing a valid justification for Japan’s hunt.  Both are based on distinct and 
mutually extensive ideas of intrinsic value.  Each system deals with a perspective on intrinsic 
value and how that value is associated with a proper human understanding of nature.  Intrinsic 
(or inherent) value is the quality of possessing worth or merit beyond what a price can reflect 
(Gillroy 2000).  Intrinsic value is the quality of being valued non-instrumentally.  It is said that 
nature has intrinsic value because of its systemic functioning as a complex of intricately related 
entities that are interdependent, but that possess capacities, abilities, and purposes of its own, and 
which has created us as its highest form of expression (Gillroy et al. 2008, 233).  Nature then, as 
a whole, has an inherent value independent of people, and not just for what the individual parts 
of nature are worth monetarily.  Because of humans’ moral capacity, people have a responsibility 
to establish and preserve harmony between the natural world and the artificial world (Gillroy et 
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al. 2008).  This is because humanity’s destiny is tied to nature’s.  Therefore, it is in peoples’ best 
interest to ensure that nature is conserved or preserved.   
The Argument from Biocentrism 
The first relevant perspective on nature’s intrinsic value is biocentrism, which calls for a 
moral duty to nature.  Biocentrism subscribes to the belief that each organism on earth has an 
intrinsic value as an individual, with a set of moral rights as a creature.  Something has value in 
and of itself, which is an assessment of worth that supersedes a market price.  Each organism, 
then, is entitled to ethical treatment by coexisting organisms on the earth.  A biocentric 
perspective of nature maintains that human beings are equivalent to all other species, and that 
people ought behave in ways that respect the intrinsic value, moral integrity, and due freedom of 
all organisms (Taylor 1986 ).  Not only do people have a responsibility to nature as a whole, but 
people also owe respect to those creatures that inhabit nature’s ecosystems and are entitled to 
that freedom of existence on account of their intrinsic value. 
The biocentric argument in favor of the ethical treatment of dolphins as advanced, 
human-like life forms is most articulately presented by Paul Taylor, author of Respect for 
Nature, who argues that biocentrism is grounded in rationality.  Humans will thus have respect 
for all natural species if they know what is in their best interest. 
Taylor (1986) puts forth four foundational pillars that form the biocentric belief system: 
1. Humans are members of the Earth’s natural community in the same sense and on 
the same terms as other living things. 
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2. The survival of each living thing, as well as its chances of flourishing, is 
determined by its relations to other living things.  
3. Each organism represents an individual life form with the right to pursue its own 
good in its own way. 
4. Human beings are not inherently superior to other species. 
Japan’s practices are at odds with these requirements for respecting nature in policy.  At 
the core of the biocentric philosophy lies a respect for freedom.  According to Taylor, an 
organism is said to be free if it has the ability and opportunity to promote or protect its good 
according to the laws of nature.  The most easily recognizable instance of an animal being denied 
freedom is when it is caged, or in a tank, and prevented from physically moving about in a 
normal way.  Another example of being “unfree” is when animals are trained or disciplined.  
This imposes external constraints on animals, and represents the human mark of alleged 
superiority.  The sheer joy of a dolphin’s leap is partially lost when the behavior arises on 
schedule from a command (Rose et al 2006).  Freedom is valuable to nonhuman animals for the 
same reason and to the same extent that humans value it.  For this reason, people should feel 
united with all other life forms under this concept, and should feel compelled to display the 
respect that they are conditioned to display towards members of the human species.   
If human consciousness is the ethical standard for comparing animals with humans, then 
the closer that species to us, the more they should be protected for the sake of the advanced 
degree of their life form (Verhoog 2000).  A strict interpretation of this would resemble 
speciesism, but this is not implied by the previous statement.  Rather:  
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“It does not mean that animals have all the same rights as you and I have.  Opponents of 
speciesism are well aware of the existence of differences between members of our species and 
members of other species.  Because of these differences, it would be meaningless to attribute to 
nonhuman animals such rights as the right to vote…But then, it is equally meaningless to give 
such rights to a 2-year-old human…We should not allow species to determine the wrongness of 
taking life.  If it is wrong to take the life of a severely brain-damaged human infant, it must be at 
least as wrong to take the life of a dog” (Singer 2006, 4-6 ). 
The case for dolphins’ intrinsic value using the biocentric policy paradigm is supported 
by strong scientific and biological evidence for a very advanced neuroanatomical configuration 
in the dolphin brain, and for their psychological continuity with human brains.  Scientists have 
gone so far as to deem the dolphin a “non-human person.”  Spindle cells found in dolphin brains 
are only found in the great apes, elephants, and other cetacean brains, indicating an exclusive 
capacity for highly intelligent behavior and higher order cognition.  The World Society for the 
Protection of Animals (WSPA) together with the Humane Society of the United States (HSUS) 
maintain that the behavior and psychological literature brims with examples of highly 
sophisticated cognition in dolphins, including findings of self-awareness and unnaturally high 
intelligence comparable to that of a human child.  Wild dolphins also engage in very highly 
organized social interactions (Marino 2008 as cited by Rose et al. 2006).  The complexity of 
sonar communication may provide the vocalization basis for designating a language.  Dolphins 
have been found to understand syntax, an advanced linguistic concept revolving around the rules 
governing the organization of language.  Dolphins also have unique whistles, which may indicate 
that they address each other directly.  All of these facts serve to support an appreciation of 
dolphins as one of the most advanced life forms on the planet. 
10 
 
Available evidence suggests that great apes and dolphins are the most cognitively, 
emotionally, and socially advanced non-human animals, and scientists are beginning to claim 
these species as “borderline persons” (Singer 2006).  Barstow (1989) finds it almost compulsory 
that humans recognize the logic of respecting cetacean life forms on the basis of their 
evolutionary advancement, describing the two highest mountain peaks of evolution on this planet 
as homo sapiens on land and cetaceans in the sea.  It goes without saying that the international 
reaction to ape hunting and killing would be immediate, impassioned, and justified.  However it 
seems as if only a small percentage of the public is aware of Japan’s drive hunting. 
Dolphins possess the same brain qualities that have always set humans apart from other 
animals.  The degree of encephalization and greatly expanded, highly fissured neocortex in the 
dolphin brain constitutes a very similar cognitive makeup as is found in humans (Schusterman et 
al. 1986).  It has also been found that the convolutedness, or amount of folding for cognitive 
surface area per unit of volume, is higher in dolphins than in chimpanzees.  Evolutionarily, 
cetaceans have developed many of the same human and primate capabilities that have 
categorized the highest forms of intelligence on the planet.  Together, the architecture, absolute 
and relative size, and apparent complexity of the dolphin brain suggest exceptional information 
processing power (Schusterman et al. 1986, 221).  Dolphin echolocation has been posited as a 
communication system that is in fact more complicated than human language.  By constructing 
reality through sound, it is possible that dolphins are engaging in the direct sharing and 
transmitting of sensory information, without having to transform that sensory data into language.  
In other words, the encoded data transmitted between dolphins via echolocation could represent 
objects being experienced in more nearly the same way by two separate beings than two humans 
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passively observing and reporting on the environment ever could achieve (Schusterman et al. 
1986, 160). 
Evidence from dolphins performing actual cognitive language tasks corroborates an 
understanding of the advanced structure and communicative sophistication detailed above.  
Dolphins display little susceptibility to both proactive and retroactive interference, which 
indicates that the animals are able to hold and manipulate information in their working memory 
while either accessing old information or being presented with something novel (Herman 1975 
as cited by Schusterman et al. 1986).  Specifically, Herman (1975) showed dolphins’ auditory 
short term memory abilities to register and maintain new sound information while updating old 
information.  It was also discovered that dolphins can represent information in different forms, 
they succeed at buffering multiple items presented in parallel for short intervals, and dolphins 
learn rules for problem solving.  A critical attribute of language competency is being able to 
produce and understand sentences that the speakers have never heard before.  This is done by 
consulting learned knowledge of semantics, or vocabulary and meaning, and also syntax, which 
constituted by structure and grammar (Herman 1975 as cited by Schusterman et al. 1986, 227).  
Dolphins were found to understand multiple kinds of sentence forms, evidenced by their 
demonstrated accuracy and reliability of responses to a set of instructions.  All of this evidence 
suggests that dolphins are like the great apes in their performance on human intelligence 
measures.  In fact, the successful use of both visual and acoustic information in these referenced 
dolphin tasks has not been paralleled in the language research with apes. 
Research also shows that the species is able to report on the status of objects in addition 
to responding to those objects.  Procedures showed that semantic references could be made to 
objects that were not immediately present in time or space, with little loss of memory for the 
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instruction (Schusterman et al. 1986).  It is hard to overstate the significance of these findings.  
These reported findings are achievements of psychological development that healthy young 
humans do not experience until later childhood, and that some cognitively impaired humans 
never experience.  Finally, dolphins have also displayed multiple examples of tool use, another 
measure by which people judge the closeness of animals to us.  Brown and Norris (1956) found 
that when two dolphins wanted to play with a hidden moray eel, the dolphins killed a 
scorpionfish and used its spines to coax the eel out of its cache (Schusterman et al. 1986).  
Connor & Peterson (1994) found that dolphins wore cone shaped sponges over their noses as a 
protective tool when searching for food along the sea floor (as cited by Singer 2006).  These 
demonstrations of intelligent, motivated, and organized behavior constitute only a brief venture 
into the body of literature on dolphin brains and their resulting cognitive achievements.  “If one 
will maintain that even the least intelligent of human beings has the same rights as everybody 
else, then one cannot employ the criterion of intelligence as a basis for denying whales the 
aforementioned rights” (Sandoe 1994, 2).  In fact, the closeness of cetacean intelligence to 
humans has the potential to serve as a major criterion for granting cetaceans certain rights in law. 
Like humans, dolphins are self-aware, evidenced by dolphins recognizing their own 
individual image in a mirror (Herman 1986 as cited by Rose et al 2006).  Dolphins also 
participate in alloparenting, or caring for each other’s offspring in a community fashion (Reiss & 
Marino 2007).  This display of a highly social and altruistic marine mammal instinct provides 
more evidence that dolphins constitute a human-like life form.  The case for the biocentric 
intrinsic value of dolphins is further corroborated by evidence from marine mammals in 
captivity.  Morbidity rates for captive cetaceans is significantly higher than in nature, and captive 
animals also present with depression, stress-related conditions such as ulcers, and engage in 
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stereotypical captive behaviors such as pacing, abnormal aggression, and self-mutilation (Rose et 
al. 2006).  Many of these symptoms are a result of unnaturally constraining large predators in 
artificial conditions and denying them the ability to naturally communicate, move, and hunt.  The 
exact reasons that make dolphins easy to train and attractive for audiences in aquariums and 
dolphinaria—high intelligence, personality, and self-awareness—are the same ethical-policy 
objections to their capture and confinement (Rose et al 2006).  Captivity has been demonstrated 
to be an impoverished existence for these intelligent species, which strongly suggests that the 
dolphin as an individual creature is indeed more like a human than unlike a human.  Dolphins 
even exhibit some of the same traits and behaviors considered highly virtuous in humans, 
including solidarity, courage, tenderness, long-term relationships, and performing rescues 
(Singer 2006). 
There are no restrictions on capture or killing methods for drive hunting, including time 
to death, which can take up to 25 minutes or even several hours (Regan 1982).  “Even though 
killing methods for whales are being further improved, it will never be possible to achieve such 
quick and efficient killing methods as those that are employed in the slaughter of pigs and other 
domestic animals. On this point, there is an ethically relevant difference between domestic 
farming and whaling” (Sandoe 1994, 4).  There is no concerted effort to mitigate or minimize the 
degree of stress imposed upon the animals being corralled, nor upon those who manage to escape 
(Reiss & Marino 2007).  In fact, the drive hunting capture, killing, and removal methods are 
disruptive, even from an ecocentric perspective because females are preferred, which reduces the 
species’ reproductive health and traumatizes young dolphins who may escape the hunt (Vail & 
Risch 2006 as cited by Adam 2008).  The killing of cetaceans causes grief and disorientation in 
members deprived of another whale with whom they had a relationship and become conscious of 
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permanently losing (Regan 1982).  In fact, Regenstein (1975) found that there were multiple 
documented instances in which a whale was harpooned or captured and taken to shore, and its 
mate or family followed it and waited offshore for its return for up to weeks at a time (as cited by 
Regan 1982, 104).  It is clear that Japanese hunting policies cause damage that has serious 
psychological implications for the organisms—something that the majority of the international 
community has recognized. 
Animal populations in the wild are usually omitted from discussions and legislation 
passed to avoid animal cruelty, such as the United States’ Humane Slaughter Act of 1958.  The 
precedent of leaving wild populations out of the debates should not continue, as these species 
warrant the same moral consideration as those in captivity or domesticated (Singer 2006).  The 
IWC recognized in 1980 that the harpooning of cetaceans is an inhumane method of hunting 
because of the pain and/or suffering it causes the animal, and defined humane killing as that 
which causes death without pain, stress, or distress perceptible to the animal (Simmonds & 
Hutchinson 1996, 66).  This is not the case in Japan.  Although not a party to the IWC, Japan’s 
methods of stabbing trapped dolphins in shallow water ought be condemned for their 
ostentatious disregard of what the international community believes is legal marine mammal 
management.  While Japan may claim that the rest of the world also kills animals for their 
economies, stabbing a dolphin in shallow water necessarily carries drastically different ethical 
implications than does the stunning and immediate killing of domesticated livestock elsewhere. 
Dolphins represent a unique and special case when it comes to exploitation of natural 
resources by people.  My claim here is that dolphins, because of their advanced brain capacities 
and highly evolved behavioral patterns, deserve an ethical consideration and biocentrically 
justified policy that matches their special worth as a species in and of itself.  For the same reason 
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that people do not hunt chimpanzees, the world’s population of wild dolphins should be shown 
their due respect as animals that are more like humans than different from them.  Making a 
biocentric argument in defense of dolphins allows us to place due legal weight on their intrinsic 
value as individual creatures, and offers us a legal pathway to justifying why dolphins in 
particular, unlike other domesticated species, should be protected by the international legal 
system. 
 
The Argument from Ecocentrism 
The second relevant perspective on nature’s intrinsic value is ecocentrism, which 
concerns the functional value of ecosystem components to the ultimate total intrinsic value of 
nature itself.  That dolphins have functional intrinsic value means that dolphins are necessary to 
and are fundamental constituents of healthy aquatic ecosystems.  The dolphin species, 
collectively, interacts with and contributes to the ocean environment in such a way that cannot be 
quantified, replicated, or substituted.  An ecocentric perspective of nature’s intrinsic value 
requires that holistic systems of interconnectedness be viewed as the highest expressions of 
perfection in nature, and that this value is degraded by the actions of humanity on those 
ecosystems.  Humans must use nature carefully and without waste, and must respect the integrity 
of natural systems as functional ends in themselves (Gillroy 2000, 140).  This requires that “such 
an imperative produces duties and rights that take precedence over the maximization of wealth” 
(Gillroy 2000, 145).  Thus, we consider the functional value of nature to be intrinsic, rather than 
instrumental, for the value that lies in the undisturbed systemic existence of nature and not 
simply in how humans might make use of it to their advantage. 
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The case for dolphins’ functional intrinsic value to the health of natural ecosystems is the 
second piece of this two part criticism of Japanese dolphin hunting policies.  Immanuel Kant 
details the distinctly human responsibility to those ecosystems for their own good but also 
because humans realize that they are at once dependent on and a part of those environments.  By 
appreciating humans’ categorical duties to nature, a Kantian understanding of nature requires 
that humans treat habitats and their component species as independent entities with their own 
ends that, critically, assist us in achieving our own duties to ourselves.  Therefore, our freedom 
as humans is tied to the freedom of species and the proper functioning of ecosystems considered 
intrinsically.   
Japan’s policies objectify dolphins as individual economic opportunities with only 
instrumental value, and fail to recognize the importance of the species as a whole for the 
functional intrinsic value that it contributes to aquatic ecosystems.  Japan would benefit from 
considering the merits of an ecosystem-centered approach to environmental policy as an 
alternative to the market incentive for capture and slaughter, because viewing dolphins strictly 
economically fails to honor their functional intrinsic value as being vital to the health of 
ecosystems and thus to ourselves.  Japan currently places economic profitability above what is 
the value of healthy aquatic ecosystems to humanity which is, and ought to be a concern for 
international environmental law.  The market itself, which is part of Japan’s defense for their 
practices, is misleading and problematic and rather fuels the Japanese dolphin hunts.  Accurate 
behavioral data can only be collected in the wild where the dolphins’ natural behavior and social 
structures can be observed (Rose et al. 2006).  Therefore, when Japan claims to need dolphin 
takes for research purposes, the international community may have reason to question this. 
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If humans are to live to our fullest biological capacities, we must realize that this requires 
successful and peaceful ecological coexistence with other species in the wild.  Policy should 
support this. Japan cannot achieve this by supporting the entertainment industry.  From a 
biological point of view, humans are absolutely dependent upon the soundness of the biosphere.  
Japan’s disproportionate influence on their aquatic ecosystems must be reevaluated if these 
ecosystems are to be protected by policy design.  As put forth by Kant, the freedom of 
individuals is tied up in the health of natural ecosystems, of which dolphins are an essential part 
(Gillroy 2000).  Therefore, dolphins should not be reduced to commodities, either economic or 
entertainment, because doing so does not account for their full value to nature and what should 
be the same value to us.  Japan overlooks the significance of what the dolphin species as a 
holistic entity means for aquatic ecosystems.  This is because Japan fails in their categorical duty 
to natural systems.  In doing so, not only are the Earth’s species detrimentally affected, but 
human beings will be worse off for the inordinate damage caused to ecosystems by the annual 
Japanese drive hunts.  This, then, is the task of policy evaluation. 
D’Amato and Chopra (1991) supply an understanding of what may explain this drastic 
change of ecocentric values on an international level, through the development of a “cultural 
consciousness,” or the establishment and refinement of a humanistic ethic with six historical-
analytical stages (Simmonds & Hutchinson 1996).  This provides us with a philosophical 
framework for examining the way humans have been partially successful at accounting for the 
functional intrinsic value of the environment in legislation and policy.  D’Amato and Chopra 
trace the consciousness of humanity’s relationship with the environment through the following 
stages, asserting that “the entitlement of whales to live and be left alone has arguably resulted 
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from the developing practices of various institutions—international, conventional and national—
concerned with whaling.” 
1. Free Resource Stage (up to WWI) 
2. Regulation Stage (1918-1931) 
3. Conservation Stage (1931-1945) 
Conservation becomes Protection (1945-1977) 
4. Protection Stage (1977-1982) 
5. Preservation Stage (1982-1990) 
6. Emerging Entitlement Stage (present/future?) 
 
These stages can be mapped onto an evolutionary timeline of humanity’s recognition of 
nature’s functional intrinsic value.  While the entitlement stage may be a hypothetical final 
position in this argument, it is worth considering the path from free resource at least to 
preservation.  Before World War I, the practice of hunting cetaceans (i.e. whales) was ultimately 
free, unregulated, and consequently resulted in the serious depletion of many species, which had 
been viewed literally as “free resources” for exploitation.  After the war, the fishing and whaling 
industries realized that their ability to yield profits depended directly on the availability of large 
numbers of those species, and on the health of those organisms, a recognition that characterized 
the regulation stage (D’Amato & Chopra 1991).  Soon after, whalers began assessing the 
longevity of their economic activities, which brought about new legislation to protect their 
industries, such as the 1931 Convention which prohibited killing calves and young whales as 
well as female whales accompanied by calves.  This move into conserving the whale population 
was still motivated by the desire for industry to secure their long-term profitability, and was not 
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for the sake of the cetacean stocks.  However, it is clear that the sense of consciousness about 
man’s relationship with natural resources is broadening through these decades. 
The transition from the conservation stage to the protection stage is a psychological one, 
and whose date is hard to pinpoint exactly although is it suggested that Stockholm (1977) was 
the official turning point.  The change in attitude towards cetaceans was far from uniform, but 
can be traced through the development of new conventions and the IWC.  The International 
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW) came into effect in 1948, and held in its 
preamble that “it is in the interest of the nations of the world to safeguard for future generations 
the great natural resource represented by the whale stocks” (D’Amato & Chopra 1991).  It also 
conceded that the history of whaling had seen the overfishing of one species after another, an 
admission that held much weight for national sentiment and future progress.  The ICRW then 
established the IWC which met annually to review and reevaluate quotas and protected species.  
Then, in the IWC’s tenth meeting in 1958, the humaneness of killing methods was discussed.  
The United Nations corroborated their discussion at the 1958 Geneva Conference with the 
adoption of a resolution entitled, “Humane Killing of Marine Life” (D’Amato & Chopra 1991).  
This promising advancement in recognition of human’s relationship to the natural world 
reflected a growing consciousness, even outside of the IWC, that the international community 
felt regarding the proper treatment of marine life. 
The movement continued to evolve increasingly towards protectionism, and in December 
of 1982 the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea was opened for signature.  Article 
65 of that document held that: “States should cooperate with a view to the conservation of 
marine mammals and in the case of cetaceans shall in particular work through the appropriate 
international organizations for their conservation, management, and study” (D’Amato & Chopra 
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1991).  This provision, above and beyond addressing the importance of sustaining the population 
for industry, significantly recognized and accounted for the plight of the animals in question.  
The fact that the UN was responsible for this legislation is important for the fact that it 
supersedes the authority of the IWC in coordinating the nature of humanity’s relationship with 
the environment.  When the IWC finally enacted a moratorium on commercial whaling in 1986, 
cetacean species finally were granted some degree of preservation.  However, the moratorium 
lacks a provision for becoming permanent. 
The six stages described above may be regarded as a historical documentation of a human 
progression from pure self-interest to environmental altruism, or a transition from individualism 
to communalism (D’Amato & Chopra 1991).  At first, early whalers were forced to accept 
environmental facts of decreasing stocks and the need for regulation, which in part hindered their 
individual freedom.  Then, the practice of conserving cetaceans was embraced as a rational 
business strategy which would prevent whalers from undermining their own livelihoods.  As the 
cultural consciousness continued to evolve, whalers’ livelihoods became increasingly threatened, 
but the trade-off was a heightened appreciation of the environment as a whole and 
acknowledgment of the fact that everyone’s self-interest was being protected by maintaining the 
integrity of aquatic ecosystems.  These stages illustrate an evolution of humanity’s sense of duty 
to the Earth, and this offers a framework for embracing the fact that humans are open systems 
whose existences are dependent on the environment (D’Amato & Chopra 1991).   
This very effective historical journey offers a brief cross-section of the international 
community’s philosophical-policy development that is inconsistent with current Japanese policy. 
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Instead of continuing to sanction drive hunts for the use of cetaceans as a source of 
economic revenue, Japan should recognize the importance of the already established 
international organization of human conduct as it pertains to the functional integrity of Earth’s 
ecosystems.  Those ecosystems contain humans and natural systems that coexist, and—
critically—interact (Gillroy 2000).  As detailed above, the global public has already made the 
difficult decision to end the hunting of cetaceans for human economic gain, and for the sake of 
facilitating human interfaces with the environment, Japan should do the same.  The aim of public 
policy should be to protect and empower the intrinsic values of nature and concordantly of 
humanity, and this synthesis of value interactions is essential in organizing environmental policy.  
People, the policymakers, have a responsibility to incorporate this interaction into how they 
manage their behaviors.  Japan has not achieved this level of sophistication with the 
environment, which jeopardizes the integrity of its own resources and the world’s oceans.  The 
most convincing argument that can be made, of course, is that Japan should investigate its 
policies towards dolphins and other cetaceans for the sake of its own people.  Immanuel Kant 
said of humanity’s collective responsibility to nature: “Our duties toward animals are indirect 
duties toward humanity” (Kant as cited by Gillroy 2008, 234). 
Japan’s policy of capturing and slaughtering dolphins has no justification in light of the 
two ethical paradigms which prescribe proper human behavior in accordance with the 
environment’s intrinsic value.  Cetacean biologists believe that the intelligence and complexities 
of dolphin cognition demand a very different status from other animals that are slaughtered 
and/or sold into captivity.  This constitutes the major foundation for dolphins’ intrinsic value as a 
function of a biocentric understanding of natural species.  Japan is not only killing highly 
evolved, intelligent creatures (violating their duty of respect to them), but Japan is also 
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compromising the health of its natural environment while supporting the entertainment industry 
(thus failing to account for the functional integrity of inherently valuable ecosystems).  The latter 
idea of ecocentrism demands that humans respect and provide for the health of natural 
ecosystems, which is dependent on the health of its constituent species.  Further, the well being 
of humans is integrally connected to the health of the ecosystems on Earth; therefore, respecting 
and protecting nature’s intrinsic functional value is, or should be, in the rational interest of all 
people.  Japan’s current dolphin policies do not reflect these values.  The Taiji dolphin hunt 
represents an ongoing environmental abuse and injustice due to the particular qualities of 
dolphins as a species and due to the stress placed on ecosystems, both of which represent 
inconsistencies with the environmental ethics that constitute this policy argument .  The pro-
whaling mindset is detrimentally anthropocentric and places only instrumental economic value 
on ecosystems, animals, and habitats (Simmonds & Hutchinson 1996).   
Here, the problem of making a policy argument is how to regulate the interface between 
human and natural systems so that the above intrinsic value (both bio- and ecocentric) are 
accounted for, and so that human duties to nature are coordinated and fulfilled.  American 
philosopher and professor of law John Martin Gillroy claims in his book Justice & Nature (2000) 
that in order for justice to be a reality in public policy, the common public end of all human 
actions must be to empower the intrinsic capacity of nature, thus empowering ourselves (337).  
Humans have two sources of duty to nature: one is the conservation of ecosystems as a 
responsibility to ourselves, and the second is to preserve nature for its own sake as a human 
obligation to the highest good on earth (Gillroy et al. 2008, 232). Understanding intrinsic value 
allows us to consider how Japanese dolphin hunting policies might be informed by a close 
examination of dolphins as being valuable to ecosystems and thus to the population at large, as 
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well as valuable in themselves, rather than simply objects of economic opportunity for Japanese 
fishermen. 
Both of these justification or evaluation paradigms are based on the particular qualities 
these animals possess which I believe are poorly understood or not adequately appreciated, and 
because of the particular circumstances surrounding the methods of harvesting and the nature of 
the killing methods used.  I support the proper use of animals in the global economy for which 
they are intended, necessary, and worthwhile to consumers. 
Using Customary International Law to Inform Japanese Policy 
There is evidence from international law that people are making strides towards 
coordinating more appropriate human action towards the Earth’s animal resources by creating 
legislation that honors both the moral intrinsic value and functional intrinsic value of dolphins as 
living wonders of the sea, thereby adhering to the customary international ideals of biocentric 
and ecocentric respect for nature. 
Over the course of centuries, whaling is one example of a practice becoming increasingly 
controlled and/or prohibited by customary practice around the world.  This control was then 
eventually “crystallized” into a larger piece of broad legislation in the form of the IWC 1986 
moratorium on whaling, which presumably means that most nations shared similar feelings about 
the practice and about the environment.  Now, except for legalized Native American quotas for 
food purposes, states adhere to an international moratorium.  This is sufficient reason to argue 
that Japan should do the same.  The 1986 moratorium on whaling is just one instance of the 
positive results of coordinating human action with regard to the environment, and upholds the 
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ecocentric sense of respect that humans collectively owe to nature and the sense of human duty 
to the ecosystems of which we are a part. 
This crystallization of custom stems from the powerful legal concept of opinio juris sive 
necessitates, literally “an opinion of law or necessity,” which is perhaps the most persuasive 
piece of legal evidence for why Japan might be coerced by the international community to halt 
dolphin harvesting.  Opinio juris is the psychological and rational foundation for binding 
customary international law.  Adding a psychological component to the evolving practices of the 
majority of the international community would mean that just by example, Japan should feel 
compelled by customary international law to cease drive hunting on the grounds that “no one 
else does it” and it is a practice obligatory to all nations under general international law so that 
must mean something is objectionable about the practice.  In terms of both customary practice 
and on the rational grounds of opinio juris, Japanese policy ought acknowledge the fact that the 
rest of the world has elected not to hunt cetaceans.  Opinio juris is the “sense on behalf of a state 
that it is bound to the law in question” (Legal Information Institute).  Above any state’s tendency 
to comply with international norms out of habit or convenience, opinio juris offers a useful tool 
for obtaining state cooperation out of a simple sense of legal obligation.  Whereas Japan may 
claim access to the Earth’s shared resources on the grounds of the commons of the sea, it is a 
stronger argument to make that Japan should refrain from doing so simply due to the fact that 
most other nations refrain from hunting and killing dolphins.  This is a logical framework that 
makes sense given the behavior of states.  It is hard to justify why Japan should be allowed to 
continue its take of dolphins when the international community collectively objects to the 
practice. 
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If the idea of opinio juris offers only a partial argument for why Japan should adhere to 
international standards of behavior, the ICJ can be consulted as addition support for defending 
the coordination of state behavior through custom and international law.  Specifically, Article 38 
of the court’s statute contains the following provisions: 
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such 
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: 
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly 
recognized by the contesting states; 
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most 
highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of 
rules of law (icj-cij.org). 
 
Items (b) and (c) have special significance when it comes to Japan’s practices leveled 
against the practices of the majority of “civilized” states.  Japan should be bound by customary 
international law when it comes to cetacean management, simply because and especially because 
most other nations have adopted similar practices whereas Japan has not. 
From a legal perspective, the status of marine resources still reflects Japan’s supposition 
that they are inexhaustible (Nagasaki 1993).  This does not hold for other natural resources such 
as forests, coal, or elephants, the extraction or exploitation of which have all become regulated 
by a system of laws.  This movement from purely extractionist to conservationist is one that has 
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happened over the years in response to perceived and real shortages in minerals and species on 
the planet, in an effort to sustain their availability for human populations.  However, the law has 
not yet evolved to the point at which mammalian resources of the sea are protected completely 
from Japanese policies.  Also problematic is that the cetacean stocks targeted by the Japanese 
belong both to no one and to everyone, and instead represent a common resource of the 
international community.  Furthermore, this common international resource has been treated by 
the vast majority of cooperating states in a way that is vastly different from Japan’s treatment of 
that same resource.  With almost all nations respecting cetacean populations only for those 
populations then to be exploitation by Japan, we are faced with a scenario of legal 
ineffectiveness at having coordinated human actions with respect to the environment and its 
integrity.  It is therefore incumbent upon the cooperating states that they redesign policies to 
protect wild dolphins completely and indefinitely, either within the current framework of 
existing international environmental law or by creating an appropriate new legal structure with 
provisions for these animals that resembles the 1986 moratorium and to whose adherence is 
made compulsory by Japan (Adam 2008). 
The challenge at hand concerns how to achieve coordinated action of all states, both 
those along migratory routes for small cetaceans and those involved in the industry which fuels 
the drive hunting in Japan.  The concept of coordinating a collective human interface with 
aquatic ecosystems and their constituent species must be inherent in any scheme that is attempted 
for the protection of small cetaceans.  Persuading states to relinquish part of their national 
sovereignty for the sake of the provisions affirmed by the above pieces of legislation and by the 
philosophy of international law will be the only way to ensure the welfare of cetaceans and other 
oceanic species.  The “decision to impose a moratorium will not be the sole responsibility of one 
27 
 
regime… it will be a decision of the global community, represented by those international legal 
regimes created for the purpose of saving biodiversity, and will constitute synergetic 
implementation of them all” (Adam 2008, 177). 
The following discussed pieces of current international legislation contribute to the case 
for why Japan’s policies should be revised to better comply with international standards through 
customary practice.  Each of the policies discussed succeeds in accounting for a proper 
understanding of both moral and functional intrinsic value by creating provisions that honor 
biocentric and ecocentric perspectives on man’s relationship to the natural world.  They serve to 
direct the necessary policy changes required regarding Japan’s management of marine resources 
based on the international community’s example. 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (1973).  The demand for dolphins 
in the entertainment industry is behind the increase in their take in the Taiji drive hunts (Adam 
2008).  Here, CITES, with 175 states parties (including Japan), is extremely relevant and may 
offer positive international authority to ban the selling of dolphins into captivity.  This legal tool 
has the potential to stop the export of live cetaceans.  If there is a ban on the export of live 
dolphins, it is likely that Japan will lose a large part of the economic motivation for drive 
hunting.  To date, the Secretariat has claimed to lack evidence that the dolphin trade now taking 
place detrimentally affects existing wild populations (Adam 2008).  This is an obstacle to 
implicating CITES in providing legal grounds for cessation of Japanese drive hunting, and it 
remains unclear why CITES has adopted a policy of non-interference with Japan.  It may be 
because CITES does not take the place of national localized legislation, and only supplies a 
framework that each party must choose to respect.  Domestic law needs to be drafted and 
implemented in order for CITES policies to be honored (cites.org). 
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 Related to CITES, the Humane Society of the United States reports that the World 
Association of Zoos and Aquariums has urged their 12,000 zoological facility members not to 
acquire dolphins from Japan (humanesociety.org).  The Alliance of Marine Mammal Parks and 
Aquariums recently condemned the drive hunts and has called for their 45 marine mammal 
facility members to end the trade in aquatic species with Japan.  This represents the sort of 
initiative that may be widely effective at coordinating human action for the wellbeing of the 
environment.  Both organizations have criticized the Japanese marine mammal industry as one 
that violates the code of ethics or sustainability standards for these associations, and so 
purchasing animals originally acquired by Japan would be a like violation of ethics 
(humanesociety.org).  Since 1993, the United States has not imported any marine mammals from 
Japan.  Undermining the profitability of the drive hunts through national trade barriers may be a 
passive way to end the trade in marine mammals without the need for complicated international 
legislation and the problems associated with compliance.  CITES may be a vehicle for codifying 
human’s demonstration of respect for dolphins both for their moral intrinsic value (biocentric 
worth) and for their functional intrinsic value to their ecosystems (ecocentric worth). 
Convention on Biological Diversity (1993).  Although not often cited, the CBD contains critical 
language relating to the present interest in informing Japan’s cetacean hunting policies.  The 
CBD is difficult to implement because it contains non-binding soft law instead of unambiguous 
obligations, but the text of the preamble is extremely significant, especially given that Japan is 
one of 193 parties (Adam 2008).  It states as follows: 
The contracting parties…Conscious of the intrinsic value of biological 
diversity…Conscious also of the importance of…maintaining life 
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sustaining systems of the biosphere…Affirming that the conservation of 
biological diversity is a common concern of humankind… (cbd.int) 
 
 
The language used here to describe humanity’s relationship to, appreciation of, and responsibility 
for the wellbeing and integrity of natural systems seems to juxtapose Japan’s drive hunting.  The 
preamble even refers to the value of nature as “intrinsic,” which validates the current argument 
against Japan’s continued hunting of cetaceans.  By signing onto this international document, 
Japan affirmed a dedication to the environment on paper but greatly contrasts this in practice.  
Japan’s presumed commitment to the fight against destructive human interference in the 
environment could be consulted in an attempt to confront the practice of dolphin harvesting as a 
gross violation of this obvious pledge to eradicate such activities.  Legislation that commits to 
preserve biodiversity is one of the most obvious demonstrations of respect for both types of 
nature’s intrinsic value, stemming from both biocentric and ecocentric conceptions of nature’s 
worth.  It is clear that the international community, by drafting and ratifying legal agreements to 
protect the Earth’s resources, is making strides towards globally coordinating human interaction 
with nature. 
International Whaling Commission 1986 Moratorium.  A moratorium on commercial whaling 
was proposed as early as 1971 by the IWC, but their Scientific Committee could not at that time 
scientifically justify a total ban.  When in the 1970s it was found that Antarctic whale stocks 
were severely decimated, the authority of the IWC was questioned and it was proposed that the 
United Nations assume control of the regulation of whaling so that it might be done properly 
(D’Amato & Chopra 1991).  At a following IWC meeting, the representative of the International 
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Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) stated that it did not seem 
justifiable to delay a moratorium, given that it was only permitting “the use of a resource 
belonging to all nations for the marginal benefit of relatively few people” (D’Amato & Chopra 
1991).  With the IWC’s 1986 moratorium on commercial whaling, it become apparent that 
people were institutionalizing the preservation of species, a development that leads us closer to 
the present.  The question now is whether that preservation stage will evolve to its logical final 
state, which would bestow upon cetaceans an entitlement to life.  This entitlement to life would 
be the ultimate display of respect for the intrinsic value of cetaceans, and the provision would be 
an embodiment of humanity’s recognition of the importance of biocentric and ecocentric 
perspectives on the natural world. 
 
Conclusion 
Therefore, by making an argument from law for law, it has been demonstrated that 
current Japanese cetacean hunting policies are inadequate because they continue to ignore both 
the moral intrinsic value of dolphins as intelligent, highly evolved life forms and the functional 
intrinsic value of dolphins and healthy ecosystems as being critical to the wellbeing of humanity.  
Japan’s policies do this by failing to subscribe to the appropriate organization of a human 
interface with the environment, which would require coordinating behaviors with a view towards 
biocentric and ecocentric valuation of nature. 
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